Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (1976), Chapter 1.

Main Argument:
Taylor’s book is a study of the possibility (and rationality) of voluntary cooperation among individuals when binding agreements to insure cooperation are not possible. The problems associated with public goods delivery are valid for a narrower range of conditions than its proponents have recognized; there are important classes of conditions under which rational actors (including purely egoistic actors) will cooperate to produce public goods.  Cooperation in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma that one would find in anarchy can indeed be rational under certain conditions.
Method: Taylor uses a rational choice/game theory approach to the traditional arguments of Hobbes and Hume. Taylor examines the problem of collective action as an N-person Prisoners’ Dilemma supergame, and finds several conditions in which the outcome of cooperation among all parties is in equilibrium. Taylor is able to show that time matters in the outcome of public goods provision, even in the absence of the state.
Key Definitions:
Anarchy [General]: a condition of statelessness
Anarchy [Taylor]: more than a mere “condition of statelessness”; rather anarchies still use redistributive techniques to maintain social order and have wide political participation [10]
== Notes: ==
*  Taylor discusses the relationship between the prisoners\’ dilemma and the arguments of Hobbes and Hume
*  Traditional arguments state that if public goods cannot be produced by voluntary, cooperative conduct, then this justifies the existence of the state
*  Anarchists deny this, claiming that the state saps the very cooperative tendencies that Hobbes and Hume want it to support
*  By stating that if voluntary cooperation in the production of public goods is both rational and otherwise possible, Taylor maintains that this argument for the state is not cogent –> anarchy is a possibility that still allows public goods provision
*Taylor introduces the significance of a time dimension (repeated prisoner’s dilemmas)
Critique: Taylor does not have to validate assumptions of the state that he is arguing against, namely: Because the members of the public will not voluntarily cooperate to produce public goods, they must be coerced into doing so –> this is not necessarily true
The existence and operation of the state presupposes an enormous amount of uncoerced cooperative conduct on the part of the public
== Anarchy & Cooperation ==
* Note that this summary draws from Taylor, Michael. 1982. Community, anarchy, and liberty. Chapter 1. Based on the argument in “Anarchy and Cooperation” (1976).
Main Argument:
In the absence of state social order can only be maintained if relations among people are those characteristic of community. Taylor defines anarchy as more than a mere “condition of statelessness”; rather anarchies still use redistributive techniques to maintain social order and have wide political participation [10].
Taylor uses a rational choice approach to demonstrate how order can be achieved in an anarchic society and power relations in general in a anarchic society. By tracing out games between actors, Taylor is able to show how possession of power depends on each actor’s access to resources and actor B’s preferences and beliefs about what A is offering him (threat vs offer) [18].