Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation (1968).

‘Summary: Lijphart starts with the contention that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting politically relevant affiliations. So why does the Dutch case contradict this? Lijphart argues that it is because the ‘‘elites’’ subscribe to the ‘politics of accomodation.’ Things work in Dutch democracy because leaders play by special rules of the game, and because people defer to their leader’s authority. Lijphart identifies seven rules that are played by, three of which (here, the first three) seem to be specific to the Dutch case: 1) Proportionality; 2) The Depoliticization of Politics; 3) Summit Diplomacy (elites in secret meetings); 4) Politics as Business (something serious, not a game); 5) An Agreement to Disagree ; 6) Secrecy; 7) The Government’s right to govern

 

Method: Two sections, two methods – no unity. Section 1 is a statistical documentation of the Dutch case and an argument for why it should lead to political instability. Section 2 is a denial of the logical implications of the first through an examination of the Dutch case