Tselbelis & Money argue that the interaction between the two chambers in bicameral legislatures is the key to understanding behaviour within each chamber. The authors examine how bicameral legislatures in fifty countries produce legislation. The authors use cooperative models to establish that bicameral legislatures, in comparison to unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. They then use noncooperative game-theory models to investigate the significance of institutional devices governing intercameral relations: where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word (think veto players), how many times a bill can pass between chambers, and whether conference committees are called.
Method: The authors use both cooperative and noncooperative game-theoretic models to understand interactions between chambers in fifty countries. They support their models with data from the French Republic, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, US and the EU.
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