Eva Bellin, “Contingent democrats: Industrialists, labor and democratization in latedeveloping countries”, World Politics 52 (2000), pp. 175-205.

_Summary: _ Capital and labor are “contingent”, not consistent, democrats. This contingency, moreover, is not random. Support for democratization turns on whether capital and labor see their economic interests served by the authoritarian state. This, in turn, is shaped by two key factors for each social force. For capital, democratic enthusiasm hinges on its level of state dependence and fear of social unrest. For labor, democratic enthusiasm hinges on its level of state dependence and aristocratic position in society. The relationship is an inverse one, with higher values of dependency, fear, and aristocracy translating into reduced enthusiasm for democratic reform.  At the same time, capital and labour’s alliance with authoritarianism is not carved in stone. The political disposition of capital and labour is governed by interest. As political and economic conditions change, interests may change and alliances may be recalculated. Also, for both social forces, the particular conditions of late development may dampen social forces’ enthusiasm for democracy.



_Method:_ Typology created and tested through in depth case studies (Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico) and supplemental corroborating brief case examinations (Brazil, Mexico, Saudia Arabia, Zambia, Egypt, Tunisia)