Robert H. Bates (ed.) Toward a Political Economy of Development (1988), Chapters 4, 5, 7, 10

=== Chapter 4 – Taiwan’s Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory ===

_Alice H. Amsden_


_Summary:_ The Taiwanese state was a key agent in the process of capital accumulation because it dominated it. Dependency theory thus doesn’t quite explain, as it depends on the assumption of domestic economic decisions being dictated by the core, which did not occur in Taiwan.




*Dependency theory has trouble explaining the Taiwanese case.

*Japanese occupation left a foundation for subsequent development

* History of Taiwanese agriculture

* Monopoly on fertilizers mad every peasant beholden to the state – also allow the state to determine the crucial equation in economic development: the transfer of surplus from agriculture to industry (cf. Bates)

* Agriculture in Taiwan gave industrial capital a labour force, a surplus, and foreign exchange.

* RE: Dependency theory: The Taiwanese experience suggests NOT that trade and foreign investment determines what is produced, but the opposite.


=== Chapter 5 – State and Alliances in Argentina, 1956-1976 ===

_Guillermo O’Donnell_


*     Argentina’s incorporation into the world capitalist system is peculiar

**     Cap expansion determined by the incorporation of some of its regions as exporters of primary products

**     Cereal, wool and beef exporting covered a relatively larger portion of national territory than in other countries – Arg was more homogenous than rest of LA

**     Greater diversification and prosperity of the pampa region and its urban centers compared to the regions dominated by the enclave, the plantations and the hacienda.

*     Thus, due to the characteristics of Argentina’s inclusion into the world cap system, its economic growth was powered fundamentally by its civil society and its relationship with the international market.

*     Cycles and Pendulums

**     Wage goods = main export products -> alliances b/w urban bourgeoisie and the popular sector

**     Two dominant sectors of the Argentine bourgeoisie were often in different political camps – primarily due to shifting alliances with the popular sector

**     Large bourgeoisie shifts its support from the pampa bourgeoisie to the hacienda bourgeoisie

**     Shifts in relative prices led the large bourgeoisie to reevaluate, and shift support in order to maximize short term economic interests (due to the absence of a tutelary state)

*     The state

**     Was repeatedly razed to the ground by civil society’s changing coalitions

**     Was extensively colonized by civil society

*     Defensive alliances arose – but would always run up against their internal contradictions


=== Chapter 7 – Public Choice and Peasant Organization ===

_Samuel L. Popkin_




=== Chapter 10 – Governments and Agricultural Markets in Africa ===

_ Robert H. Bates _