William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (1998), Chapters 1, 7.

* Warlord Capitalism: The utilization of markets to expand personal patronage networks. It is a turn away from conventional state structures – importantly it is a rational response to globalization in weak states.
Summary: Reno is looking at how rulers control markets to enhance their own power. Rulers are able to compensate for their failures in mobilizing resources locally by mobilizing resources externally – they use elements of formal sovereignty for purposes other than those intended by convention. Access to structural adjustment funds, etc., allow the bureaucratic apparatus to decay even as rulers’ patronage networks extends. The effect is the commercialization of political struggle – patronage depends on access to capital, which is done externally – whoever controls access to the global markets has political clout.
Important Insights: The global economy gives rulers tools with which they can respond to political struggle by acting in their own interest.  This links nicely with Jackson & Rosberg.
=== Notes ===
Chapter 1
“Contemporary rulers who lack capable administrations find markets to be useful for controlling and disciplining rivals and their supporters. Intervening in markets enables rulers to accumulate wealth directly, which is then converted into political resources they can distribute at their discretion. This strategy directly contradicts liberal principles of private markets, since it is designed to block entrepreneurial activity among threatening rivals. But it is not state action, since the intervention can occur through the agency of individual commercial partners rather than formal state institutions.” (21)
“Overall, recognizing that the often violent contest to control commerce is a way politics functions in the post-Cold War quasi-state allows one to see that global markets serve a variety of internal political functions that neorealist and structuralist analyses of Africa’s weak states do not consider.”  (26)
“The real question for these rulers is how to manage elites who discover a dramatically wider scope for personal gain through the manipulation of global political and economic changes. Incumbent rulers accordingly subordinate external pressure to conform to a particular standard in attempts to resolve this internal crisis.