Summary: This volume outlines a theoretical research agenda to study the impact of the EU on the accession countries and presents the findings of comparative analyses. Seeks to explain Europeanization (defined as “rule adoption”, where rules can be formal or informal). Finds that the external incentives model generally explains the broader patterns of rule adoption well
Method: This chapter develops three main explanatory models that specify different mechanisms of Europeanization and the conditions under which nonmember states adopt EU rules. These models differ on two key dimensions: Europeanization can be either EU-driven or domestically driven; and whether the logic of action is a logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness.
Important Insight: The influence of the EU depends crucially on the context in which the EU uses its incentives. Depending on the context, a more limited set of factors explains variation in rule adoption. In the context of democratic conditionality, credible conditionality and adoption costs are key variables. In the context of acquis conditionality, the scope conditions are a credible membership perspective and the setting of EU rules as requirements for membership.
-key point: this volume outlines a theoretical research agenda to study the impact of the EU on the accession countries and presents the findings of comparative analyses. Seeks to explain Europeanization (defined as “rule adoption”, where rules can be formal or informal). Finds that the external incentives model generally explains the broader patterns of rule adoption well. However, a key insight that we derive from the contributions to the volume is that the influence of the EU depends crucially on the context in which the EU uses its incentives. We thus suggest distinguishing b/w the context of democratic conditionality and the context of acquis conditionality.
-depending on the context, a more limited set of factors explains variation in rule adoption. In the context of democratic conditionality, credible conditionality and adoption costs are key variables. In the context of acquis conditionality, the scope conditions are a credible membership perspective and the setting of EU rules as requirements for membership.
-the desire of most Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to join the EU, combined with the high volume of intrusiveness of the rules attached to membership, allow the EU an unprecedented influence in restructuring domestic institutions and the entire range of public policies in the CEECs. For member states, the EU sets over 80% of economic regulations, and the EU’s membership requirements include proof of the ability to implement the entire range of the acquis communautaire, regularly cited as including over 80 000 pages of legislation.
-while most commentators argue that the influence of the EU is pervasive, however, the extent and manners in which the EU exercises its influence on the accession countries is much less clear.
-the study of “Europeanization East” contributes to and links several bodies of literature and addresses systematic lacunae in all of them:
-enlargement: focuses on the member states’ enlargement preferences and the EU’s enlargement decisions and policies.
-But the process of adoption in the candidate countries is seriously understudied in this literature.
-transition: looks at the transformation of the former communist systems of the CEECs and their more or less successful transition to democracy. These studies examine the adoption and institutionalization of liberal norms and the consolidation of democratic systems from the other angle – that of national political systems and domestic politics.
-But the international environment and the impact of international organizations have traditionally been regarded as secondary in the literature on transitions.
-EU governance: studies the EU as a multilevel political system with specific features of policymaking.
-But it is failed to examine the external role of the Union.
-Europeanization: studies the impact of policy outcomes and institutions at the European level on domestic polities, politics, and policies.
-But this focus has been limited to the Europeanization of member states.
-international institutions: focuses on the questions of how and under what conditions international regimes are established and become durable in an anarchical international environment.
-But this approach has yet to be applied to the CEECs.
-the DV, Europeanization, is defined as rule adoption. This is measured and classified on two main dimensions: (1) The likelihood of adoption; (2) The implementation and enforcement of rules, rather than simply the legal transposition of rules.
-we develop three main explanatory models that specify different mechanisms of Europeanization and the conditions under which nonmember states adopt EU rules. These models differ on two key dimensions: Europeanization can be either EU-driven or domestically driven; and whether the logic of action is a logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness.
-the three explanatory models are:
1) the external incentives model: follows a logic of consequences and is driven by the external (not domestic) rewards and sanctions that the EU adds to the cost-benefit calculations of the rule adopting state. A government adopts EU rules if the benefits of the EU rewards exceed the adoption costs.
-to make this proposition more concrete and formulate testable hypotheses for explaining variation, we suggest that the cost-benefit balance depends on four sets of factors:
-the determinacy of conditions: the likelihood of rule adoption increases, if rules are set as conditions for rewards and the more determinate they are.
-the size and speed of rewards: the likelihood of rule adoption increases with the size and speed of rewards.
-the credibility of threats and promises: the likelihood of rule adoption increases with the credibility of threats and promises.
-the size of adoption costs: The likelihood of rule adoption decreases with the number of veto players incurring net adoption costs (opportunity costs, welfare, and power losses) from compliance.
-is an actor-centred, rationalist bargaining model. The outcome of the bargaining process depends on the relative bargaining power of the actors, which results from the asymmetrical distribution of (1) information and (2) the benefits of a specific agreement compared with those of alternative oucomes or ‘outside options.’
-assumes that the EU pursues a policy of reinforcement by reward, which may affect the government directly or indirectly through the differential empowerment of domestic actors.
2) the social learning model: follows a logic of appropriateness, and emphasizes identification of the CEECs with the EU and persuasion of the CEECs by the EU of the legitimacy of its rules as key conditions for rule adoption. A government adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of EU rules
-several groups of factors impinge upon the persuasive power of the EU:
-legitimacy: The likelihood of rule adoption increases as the legitimacy of the rules increases.
-identity: The likelihood of rule adoption increases with the identification of the target government and society with the community that has established the rules.
-resonance: the likelihood of rule adoption increases with domestic resonance.
-social learning can take two routes: the EU may persuade the government of the appropriateness of its rules; or the EU may persude societal groups and organizations, which then lobby the government for rule adoption.
3) the lesson-drawing model: focuses on the adoption of EU rules as induced by the CEECs themselves, rather than through any activities of the EU; under this model, states adopt EU rules b/c they judge them as effective remedies to inherently domestic needs and policy challenges. A government adopts Eu rules if it expects these rules to solve domestic policy problems effectively.
-whether a state draws lessons from the EU rules depends on the following conditions: a government has to (1) start searching for rules abroad, (2) direct its search at the political system of the EU (and/or its member states), and (3) evaluate EU rules as suitable for domestic circumstances. These conditions in turn depend on four sets of factors:
-policy dissatisfaction: the likelihood of rule adoptions increases as the perception that domestic rules are working satisfactorily decreases.
-EU-centred epistemic communities: the likelihood of rule adoption increases the more that public policymakers have institutionalized relationships with epistemic communities that promote EU rules and the more that domestic structures are conducive to the influence of new ideas.
-rule transferability: the likelihood of rule adoption increases with the rule’s success in solving similar policy challenges in the EU and the transferability of this success.